Supreme Court of the United States
NEW JERSEY
v.
T.L.O.
No. 83-712.
Argued March 28, 1984.
Reargued Oct. 2, 1984.
Decided Jan. 15, 1985.
State brought delinquency charges against student in New Jersey juvenile court, 178 N.J.Super. 329, 428 A.2d 1327 which after denying student's motion to suppress evidence found in her purse, held that the Fourth Amendment applied to searches by school officials but that the search was a reasonable one and adjudged student to be delinquent. On appeal, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, 185 N.J.Super. 279, 448 A.2d 493, affirmed the trial court's finding that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation but vacated adjudication of delinquency and remanded on other grounds. The New Jersey Supreme Court, 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934, reversed and ordered suppression of evidence found in student's purse holding that search of purse was unreasonable, and writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Justice White, held that: (1) Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials, and (2) search of student's purse was reasonable.
Reversed.
Justice Powell, with whom Justice O'Connor joined, filed a concurring opinion.
Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Brennan with whom Justice Marshall joined, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Justice Stevens with whom Justice Marshall joined and with whom Justice Brennan joined in Part I, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Syllabus [FN*]
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.
A teacher at a New Jersey high school, upon discovering respondent, then a 14-year-old freshman, and her companion
smoking cigarettes in a school lavatory in violation of a school rule, took them to the Principal's office, where they met with the
Assistant Vice Principal. When respondent, in response to the Assistant Vice Principal's questioning, denied that she had been
smoking and claimed that she did not smoke at all, the Assistant Vice Principal demanded to see her purse. Upon opening the
purse, he found a pack of cigarettes and also noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers that are commonly associated with
the use of marihuana. He then proceeded to search the purse thoroughly and found some marihuana, a pipe, plastic bags, a
fairly substantial amount of money, an index card containing a list of students who owed respondent money, and two letters that
implicated her in marihuana dealing. Thereafter, the State brought delinquency charges against respondent in the Juvenile Court,
which, after denying respondent's motion to suppress the evidence found in her purse, held that the Fourth Amendment applied
to searches by school officials but that the search in question was a reasonable one, and adjudged respondent to be a
delinquent. The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed the trial court's finding that there had been no
Fourth Amendment violation but vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded on other grounds. The New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed and ordered the suppression of the evidence found in respondent's purse, holding that the search of
the purse was unreasonable.
Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public
school officials and is not limited to searches carried out by law enforcement officers. Nor are school officials exempt
from the Amendment's dictates by virtue of the special nature of their authority over schoolchildren. In carrying out
searches and other functions pursuant to disciplinary policies mandated by state statutes, school officials act as
representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents of students, and they cannot claim the parents'
immunity from the Fourth Amendment's strictures. Pp. 333-337. [469 U.S. 325, 326]
2. Schoolchildren have legitimate expectations of privacy. They may find it necessary to carry with them a variety of
legitimate, non-contraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to
privacy in such items by bringing them onto school grounds. But striking the balance between schoolchildren's legitimate
expectations of privacy and the school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take
place requirovered, would both corroborate the report that she had been smoking and undermine
the credibility of her defense to the charge of smoking. To be sure, the discovery of the cigarettes would not prove that T.L.O.
had been smoking in the lavatory; nor would it, strictly speaking, necessarily be inconsistent with her claim that she did not
smoke at all. But it is universally recognized that evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate
fact in issue, but only have "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. Rule Evid. 401. The relevance of T.L.O. 's
possession of cigarettes to the question whether she had been smoking and to the credibility of her denial that she smoked
supplied the necessary "nexus" between the item searched for and the infraction under investigation. See Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 306-307 (1967). Thus, if Mr. Choplick in fact had a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had cigarettes in her
purse, the search was justified despite the fact that the cigarettes, if found, would constitute "mere evidence" of a violation. Ibid.
Of course, the New Jersey Supreme Court also held that Mr. Choplick had no reasonable suspicion that the purse would
contain cigarettes. This conclusion is puzzling. A teacher had reported that T.L.O. was smoking in the lavatory. Certainly this
report gave Mr. Choplick reason to suspect that T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes with her; and [469 U.S. 325, 346] if she did have
cigarettes, her purse was the obvious place in which to find them. Mr. Choplick's suspicion that there were cigarettes in the
purse was not an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch,'" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 27; rather, it was the sort of
"common-sense conclusio[n] about human behavior" upon which "practical people" - including government officials - are entitled
to rely. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). Of course, even if the teacher's report were true, T.L.O. might
not have had a pack of cigarettes with her; she might have borrowed a cigarette from someone else or have been sharing a
cigarette with another student. But the requirement of reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty: "sufficient
probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment . . . ." Hill v. California, 401 U.S.
797, 804 (1971). Because the hypothesis that T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes in her purse was itself not unreasonable, it is
irrelevant that other hypotheses were also consistent with the teacher's accusation. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Mr.
Choplick acted unreasonably when he examined T.L.O.'s purse to see if it contained cigarettes.12 [469 U.S. 325, 347]
Our conclusion that Mr. Choplick's decision to open T.L.O.'s purse was reasonable brings us to the question of the further
search for marihuana once the pack of cigarettes was located. The suspicion upon which the search for marihuana was founded
was provided when Mr. Choplick observed a package of rolling papers in the purse as he removed the pack of cigarettes.
Although T.L.O. does not dispute the reasonableness of Mr. Choplick's belief that the rolling papers indicated the presence of
marihuana, she does contend that the scope of the search Mr. Choplick conducted exceeded permissible bounds when he
seized and read certain letters that implicated T.L.O. in drug dealing. This argument, too, is unpersuasive. The discovery of the
rolling papers concededly gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in her
purse. This suspicion justified further exploration of T.L.O.'s purse, which turned up more evidence of drug-related activities: a
pipe, a number of plastic bags of the type commonly used to store marihuana, a small quantity of marihuana, and a fairly
substantial amount of money. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable to extend the search to a separate zippered
compartment of the purse; and when a search of that compartment revealed an index card containing a list of "people who owe
me money" as well as two letters, the inference that T.L.O. was involved in marihuana trafficking was substantial enough to
justify Mr. Choplick in examining the letters to determine whether they contained any further evidence. In short, we cannot
conclude that the search for marihuana was unreasonable in any respect.
Because the search resulting in the discovery of the evidence of marihuana dealing by T.L.O. was reasonable, the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision to exclude that evidence [469 U.S. 325, 348] from T.L.O.'s juvenile delinquency proceedings on Fourth
Amendment grounds was erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is
Reversed.
Footnotes
[Footnote 1] T.L.O. also received a 3-day suspension from school for smoking cigarettes in a nonsmoking area and a 7-day
suspension for possession of marihuana. On T.L.O.'s motion, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, set aside
the 7-day suspension on the ground that it was based on evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (T.L.O. ) v.
Piscataway Bd. of Ed., No. C. 2865-79 (Super. Ct. N. J., Ch. Div., Mar. 31, 1980). The Board of Education apparently did
not appeal the decision of the Chancery Division.
[Footnote 2] State and federal courts considering these questions have struggled to accommodate the interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment and the interest of the States in providing a safe environment conducive to education in the public schools.
Some courts have resolved the tension between these interests by giving full force to one or the other side of the balance. Thus,
in a number of cases courts have held that school officials conducting in-school searches of students are private parties acting in
loco parentis and are therefore not subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., D. R. C. v. State, 646 P.2d
252 (Alaska App. 1982); In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509,
75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983); Mercer v. State, 450 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1970). At least one court has held, on the other hand, that the Fourth Amendment applies in full to in-school searches
by school officials and that a search conducted without probable cause is unreasonable, see State v. Mora, 307 So.2d 317
(La.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So.2d 900 (La. 1976); others have held or suggested that the
probable-cause standard is applicable at least where the police are involved in a search, see M. v. Board of Ed. Ball-Chatham
Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (SD Ill. 1977); Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221
(ND Ill. 1976); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 498, 216 S. E. 2d 586, 594 (1975); or where the search is highly intrusive, see
M. M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (CA2 1979).
The majority of courts that have addressed the issue of the Fourth Amendment in the schools have, like the Supreme Court of
New Jersey in this case, reached a middle position: the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school authorities,
but the special needs of the school environment require assessment of the legality of such searches against a standard less
exacting than that of probable cause. These courts have, by and large, upheld warrantless searches by school authorities
provided that they are supported by a reasonable suspicion that the search will uncover evidence of an infraction of school
disciplinary rules or a violation of the law. See, e. g., Tarter v. Raybuck, No. 83-3174 (CA6, Aug. 31, 1984); Bilbrey v.
Brown, 738 F.2d 1462 (CA9 1984); Horton v. Goose Creek [469 U.S. 325, 333] Independent School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (CA5
1982); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (NDNY 1977); M. v. Board of Ed. Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No.
5, supra; In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); State v. Baccino, 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971);
State v. D. T. W., 425 So.2d 1383 (Fla. App. 1983); State v. Young, supra; In re J. A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d
958 (1980); People v. Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N. M. 347, 540 P.2d 827
(App. 1975); People v. D., 34 N. Y. 2d 483, 315 N. E. 2d 466 (1974); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781
(1977); In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979).
Although few have considered the matter, courts have also split over whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for
Fourth Amendment violations committed by school authorities. The Georgia courts have held that although the Fourth
Amendment applies to the schools, the exclusionary rule does not. See, e. g., State v. Young, supra; State v. Lamb, 137 Ga.
App. 437, 224 S. E. 2d 51 (1976). Other jurisdictions have applied the rule to exclude the fruits of unlawful school searches
from criminal trials and delinquency proceedings. See State v. Mora, supra; People v. D., supra.
[Footnote 3] In holding that the search of T.L.O.'s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment, we do not implicitly determine
that the exclusionary rule applies to the fruits of unlawful searches conducted by school authorities. The question whether
evidence should be excluded from a criminal proceeding involves two discrete inquiries: whether the evidence was seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and whether the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for the violation. Neither
question is logically antecedent to the other, for a negative answer to either question is sufficient to dispose of the case. Thus,
our determination that the search at issue in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment implies no particular resolution of
the question of the applicability of the exclusionary rule.
[Footnote 4] Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment applies only to [469 U.S. 325, 335] punishments imposed after criminal convictions and hence does not apply to
the punishment of schoolchildren by public school officials).
[Footnote 5] We do not address the question, not presented by this case, whether a schoolchild has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in lockers, desks, or other school property provided for the storage of school supplies. Nor do we express any opinion
on the standards (if any) governing searches of such areas by school officials or by other public authorities acting at the request
of school officials. Compare Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 670 (CA10 1981) ("Inasmuch as the school had assumed
joint control of the locker it cannot be successfully maintained that the school did not have a right to inspect it"), and People v.
Overton, 24 N. Y. 2d 522, 249 N. E. 2d 366 (1969) (school administrators have power to consent to search of a [469 U.S. 325,
338] student's locker), with State v. Engerud, 94 N. J. 331, 348, 463 A. 2d 934, 943 (1983) ("We are satisfied that in the
context of this case the student had an expectation of privacy in the contents of his locker. . . . For the four years of high school,
the school locker is a home away from home. In it the student stores the kind of personal `effects' protected by the Fourth
Amendment").
[Footnote 6] See cases cited in n. 2, supra.
[Footnote 7] We here consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own authority. This
case does not present the question of the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school
officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies, and we express no opinion on that question. Cf. Picha
v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976) (holding probable cause standard applicable to searches involving
the police).
[Footnote 8] We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness standard we
adopt for searches by school authorities. In other contexts, however, we have held that although "some quantum of
individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure[,] . . . the Fourth Amendment imposes no
irreducible requirement of such suspicion." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-561 (1976). See also Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are generally appropriate
only where the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and where "other safeguards" are available "to assure that
the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not `subject to the discretion of the official in the field.'" Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 654-655 (1979) (citation omitted). Because the search of T.L.O.'s purse was based upon an individualized
suspicion that she had violated school rules, see infra, at 343-347, we need not consider the circumstances that might justify
school authorities in conducting searches unsupported by individualized suspicion.
[Footnote 9] Our reference to the nature of the infraction is not intended as an endorsement of JUSTICE STEVENS'
suggestion that some rules regarding student conduct are by nature too "trivial" to justify a search based upon reasonable
suspicion. See post, at 377-382. We are unwilling to adopt a standard under which the legality of a search is dependent upon a
judge's evaluation of the relative importance of various school rules. The maintenance of discipline in the schools requires not
only that students be restrained from assaulting one another, abusing drugs and alcohol, and committing other crimes, but also
that students conform themselves to the standards of conduct prescribed by school authorities. We have "repeatedly
emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, 393 U.S. 503, 507 [469 U.S. 325, 343] (1969). The promulgation of a rule forbidding specified conduct
presumably reflects a judgment on the part of school officials that such conduct is destructive of school order or of a proper
educational environment. Absent any suggestion that the rule violates some substantive constitutional guarantee, the courts
should, as a general matter, defer to that judgment and refrain from attempting to distinguish between rules that are important to
the preservation of order in the schools and rules that are not.
[Footnote 10] Of course, New Jersey may insist on a more demanding standard under its own Constitution or statutes. In that
case, its courts would not purport to be applying the Fourth Amendment when they invalidate a search.
[Footnote 11] JUSTICE STEVENS interprets these statements as a holding that enforcement of the school's smoking
regulations was not sufficiently related to the goal of maintaining discipline or order in the school to justify a search under the
standard adopted by the New Jersey court. See post, at 382-384. We do not agree that this is an accurate characterization of
the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion. The New Jersey court did not hold that the school's smoking rules were unrelated to
the goal of maintaining discipline or order, nor did it suggest that a search that would produce evidence bearing directly on an
accusation that a student had violated the smoking rules would be impermissible under the court's reasonable-suspicion
standard; rather, the court concluded that any evidence a search of T.L.O.'s purse was likely to produce would not have a
sufficiently direct bearing on the infraction to justify a search - a conclusion with which we cannot agree for the reasons set forth
infra, at 345. JUSTICE STEVENS' suggestion that the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision rested on the perceived triviality
of the smoking infraction appears to be a reflection of his own views rather than those of the New Jersey court.
[Footnote 12] T.L.O. contends that even if it was reasonable for Mr. Choplick to open her purse to look for cigarettes, it was
not reasonable for him to reach in and take the cigarettes out of her purse once he found them. Had he not removed the
cigarettes from the purse, she asserts, he would not have observed the rolling papers that suggested the presence of marihuana,
and the search for marihuana could not have taken place. T.L.O.'s argument is based on the fact that the cigarettes were not
"contraband," as no school rule forbade her to have them. Thus, according to T.L.O. , the cigarettes were not subject to
seizure or confiscation by school authorities, and Mr. Choplick was not entitled to take them out of T.L.O.'s purse regardless
of whether he was entitled to peer into the purse to see if they were there. Such hairsplitting argumentation has no place in an
inquiry addressed to the issue of reasonableness. If Mr. Choplick could permissibly search T.L.O.'s purse for cigarettes, it
hardly seems reasonable to suggest that his natural reaction to finding them - picking them up - could [469 U.S. 325, 347] be a
constitutional violation. We find that neither in opening the purse nor in reaching into it to remove the cigarettes did Mr.
Choplick violate the Fourth Amendment.
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, concurring.
I agree with the Court's decision, and generally with its opinion. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the special
characteristics of elementary and secondary schools that make it unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional
protections granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool setting.
In any realistic sense, students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the
population generally. They spend the school hours in close association with each other, both in the classroom and during
recreation periods. The students in a particular class often know each other and their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers
have a degree of familiarity with, and authority over, their students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship
between parent and child. It is simply unrealistic to think that students have the same subjective expectation of privacy as the
population generally. But for purposes of deciding this case, I can assume that children in school - no less than adults - have
privacy interests that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate.
However one may characterize their privacy expectations, students properly are afforded some constitutional protections. In an
often quoted statement, the Court said that students do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). The Court also has "emphasized the need
for affirming the comprehensive authority of the states and of school officials . . . [469 U.S. 325, 349] to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools." Id., at 507. See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). The Court has balanced the
interests of the student against the school officials' need to maintain discipline by recognizing qualitative differences between the
constitutional remedies to which students and adults are entitled.
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Court recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was careful to limit
the exercise of this right by a student who challenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to be "due" was notice
and a hearing described as "rudimentary"; it amounted to no more than "the disciplinarian . . . informally discuss[ing] the alleged
misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred." Id., at 581-582. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), we
declined to extend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal punishment of schoolchildren as authorized by Florida
law. We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in the school, and also in the community, provide substantial
protection against the violation of constitutional rights by school authorities. "[A]t the end of the school day, the child is
invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the child brings with him the support of family and friends and is rarely
apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness and protest any instances of mistreatment." Id., at 670. The Ingraham
Court further pointed out that the "openness of the public school and its supervision by the community afford significant
safeguards" against the violation of constitutional rights. Ibid.
The special relationship between teacher and student also distinguishes the setting within which schoolchildren operate. Law
enforcement officers function as adversaries of criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to investigate criminal
activity, to locate and arrest those who violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of such persons to trial.
Rarely does this type of adversarial [469 U.S. 325, 350] relationship exist between school authorities and pupils.1 Instead, there is a
commonality of interests between teachers and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal responsibility
for the student's welfare as well as for his education.
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the Court states, is the education and training of young people. A State has
a compelling interest in assuring that the schools meet this responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and maintaining
order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students. And apart from education, the school has the obligation to protect pupils
from mistreatment by other children, and also to protect teachers themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct
in recent years has prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the full
panoply of constitutional rules applies with the same force and effect in the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal
laws.2
In sum, although I join the Court's opinion and its holding,3 my emphasis is somewhat different.
[Footnote 1] Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement responsibility or indeed any obligation to be
familiar with the criminal laws. Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a layman's familiarity with the types
of crimes that occur frequently in our schools: the distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against teachers as well
as fellow students.
[Footnote 2] As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the contrary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions
between the rights and duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 591 (1975) (POWELL, J.,
dissenting.)
[Footnote 3] The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence
that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school," a search of the student's person or
belongings is justified. Ante, at 342. This is in accord with the Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state and
federal courts that have addressed this issue. See ante, at 332-333, n. 2. [469 U.S. 325, 351]
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment.
I join the judgment of the Court and agree with much that is said in its opinion. I write separately, however, because I believe
the Court omits a crucial step in its analysis of whether a school search must be based upon probable cause. The Court
correctly states that we have recognized limited exceptions to the probable-cause requirement "[w]here a careful balancing of
governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served" by a lesser standard. Ante, at 341. I believe
that we have used such a balancing test, rather than strictly applying the Fourth Amendment's Warrant and Probable-Cause
Clause, only when we were confronted with "a special law enforcement need for greater flexibility." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 514 (1983) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). I pointed out in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983):
"While the Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of freedom from unreasonable [searches], the Amendment does not leave
the reasonableness of most [searches] to the judgment of courts or government officers; the Framers of the Amendment
balanced the interests involved and decided that a [search] is reasonable only if supported by a judicial warrant based on
probable cause. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 744-745 (1983) (POWELL, J., concurring); United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)." Id., at 722 (opinion concurring in judgment).
See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-214 (1979); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297, 315-316 (1972). Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of
interests for that of the Framers. [469 U.S. 325, 352]
Thus, for example, in determining that police can conduct a limited "stop and frisk" upon less than probable cause, this Court
relied upon the fact that "as a practical matter" the stop and frisk could not be subjected to a warrant and probable-cause
requirement, because a law enforcement officer must be able to take immediate steps to assure himself that the person he has
stopped to question is not armed with a weapon that could be used against him. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21, 23-24
(1968). Similarly, this Court's holding that a roving Border Patrol may stop a car and briefly question its occupants upon less
than probable cause was based in part upon "the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border." United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975). See also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, n. 14 (1983); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
The Court's implication that the balancing test is the rule rather than the exception is troubling for me because it is unnecessary in
this case. The elementary and secondary school setting presents a special need for flexibility justifying a departure from the
balance struck by the Framers. As JUSTICE POWELL notes, "[w]ithout first establishing discipline and maintaining order,
teachers cannot begin to educate their students." Ante, at 350. Maintaining order in the classroom can be a difficult task. A
single teacher often must watch over a large number of students, and, as any parent knows, children at certain ages are inclined
to test the outer boundaries of acceptable conduct and to imitate the misbehavior of a peer if that misbehavior is not dealt with
quickly. Every adult remembers from his own schooldays the havoc a water pistol or peashooter can wreak until it is taken
away. Thus, the Court has recognized that "[e]vents calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require
immediate, effective action." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975). Indeed, because drug use and possession of weapons
have become increasingly common [469 U.S. 325, 353] among young people, an immediate response frequently is required not just
to maintain an environment conducive to learning, but to protect the very safety of students and school personnel.
Such immediate action obviously would not be possible if a teacher were required to secure a warrant before searching a
student. Nor would it be possible if a teacher could not conduct a necessary search until the teacher thought there was probable
cause for the search. A teacher has neither the training nor the day-to-day experience in the complexities of probable cause that
a law enforcement officer possesses, and is ill-equipped to make a quick judgment about the existence of probable cause. The
time required for a teacher to ask the questions or make the observations that are necessary to turn reasonable grounds into
probable cause is time during which the teacher, and other students, are diverted from the essential task of education. A
teacher's focus is, and should be, on teaching and helping students, rather than on developing evidence against a particular
troublemaker.
Education "is perhaps the most important function" of government, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954),
and government has a heightened obligation to safeguard students whom it compels to attend school. The special need for an
immediate response to behavior that threatens either the safety of schoolchildren and teachers or the educational process itself
justifies the Court in excepting school searches from the warrant and probable-cause requirement, and in applying a standard
determined by balancing the relevant interests. I agree with the standard the Court has announced, and with its application of the
standard to the facts of this case. I therefore concur in its judgment.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully agree with Part II of the Court's opinion. Teachers, like all other government officials, must conform their [469 U.S. 325, 354]
conduct to the Fourth Amendment's protections of personal privacy and personal security. As JUSTICE STEVENS points out,
post, at 373-374, 385-386, this principle is of particular importance when applied to schoolteachers, for children learn as much
by example as by exposition. It would be incongruous and futile to charge teachers with the task of embuing their students with
an understanding of our system of constitutional democracy, while at the same time immunizing those same teachers from the
need to respect constitutional protections. See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864-865 (1982) (plurality opinion);
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
I do not, however, otherwise join the Court's opinion. Today's decision sanctions school officials to conduct fullscale searches
on a "reasonableness" standard whose only definite content is that it is not the same test as the "probable cause" standard found
in the text of the Fourth Amendment. In adopting this unclear, unprecedented, and unnecessary departure from generally
applicable Fourth Amendment standards, the Court carves out a broad exception to standards that this Court has developed
over years of considering Fourth Amendment problems. Its decision is supported neither by precedent nor even by a fair
application of the "balancing test" it proclaims in this very opinion.
I
Three basic principles underly this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically delineated and well-recognized exceptions. See, e. g., Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); accord, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-749 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 701 (1983); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-212 (1981); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). Second, full-scale searches - whether
conducted in accordance with the warrant [469 U.S. 325, 355] requirement or pursuant to one of its exceptions - are "reasonable"
in Fourth Amendment terms only on a showing of probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that evidence
of the crime will be found in the place to be searched. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 479 (1963); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 (1949). Third, categories of intrusions that are
substantially less intrusive than full-scale searches or seizures may be justifiable in accordance with a balancing test even absent
a warrant or probable cause, provided that the balancing test used gives sufficient weight to the privacy interests that will be
infringed. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, supra.
Assistant Vice Principal Choplick's thorough excavation of T.L.O.'s purse was undoubtedly a serious intrusion on her privacy.
Unlike the searches in Terry v. Ohio, supra, or Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), the search at issue here encompassed
a detailed and minute examination of respondent's pocketbook, in which the contents of private papers and letters were
thoroughly scrutinized.1 Wisely, neither petitioner nor the Court today attempts to justify the search of T.L.O.'s pocketbook as
a minimally intrusive search in the Terry line. To be faithful to the Court's settled doctrine, the inquiry therefore must focus on the
warrant and probable-cause requirements.
A
I agree that schoolteachers or principals, when not acting as agents of law enforcement authorities, generally may conduct a
search of their students' belongings without first [469 U.S. 325, 356] obtaining a warrant. To agree with the Court on this point is to
say that school searches may justifiably be held to that extent to constitute an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement. Such an exception, however, is not to be justified, as the Court apparently holds, by assessing net social value
through application of an unguided "balancing test" in which "the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal
security" are weighed against "the government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order." Ante, at 337.
The Warrant Clause is something more than an exhortation to this Court to maximize social welfare as we see fit. It requires that
the authorities must obtain a warrant before conducting a full-scale search. The undifferentiated governmental interest in law
enforcement is insufficient to justify an exception to the warrant requirement. Rather, some special governmental interest beyond
the need merely to apprehend lawbreakers is necessary to justify a categorical exception to the warrant requirement. For the
most part, special governmental needs sufficient to override the warrant requirement flow from "exigency" - that is, from the
press of time that makes obtaining a warrant either impossible or hopelessly infeasible. See United States v. Place, supra, at
701-702; Mincey v. Arizona, supra, at 393-394; Johnson v. United States, supra, at 15. Only after finding an extraordinary
governmental interest of this kind do we - or ought we - engage in a balancing test to determine if a warrant should nonetheless
be required.2 [469 U.S. 325, 357]
To require a showing of some extraordinary governmental interest before dispensing with the warrant requirement is not to
undervalue society's need to apprehend violators of the criminal law. To be sure, forcing law enforcement personnel to obtain a
warrant before engaging in a search will predictably deter the police from conducting some searches that they would otherwise
like to conduct. But this is not an unintended result of the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy; rather, it is the very
purpose for which the Amendment was thought necessary. Only where the governmental interests at stake exceed those
implicated in any ordinary law enforcement context - that is, only where there is some extraordinary governmental interest
involved - is it legitimate to engage in a balancing test to determine whether a warrant is indeed necessary.
In this case, such extraordinary governmental interests do exist and are sufficient to justify an exception to the warrant
requirement. Students are necessarily confined for most of the schoolday in close proximity to each other and to the school staff.
I agree with the Court that we can take judicial notice of the serious problems of drugs and violence that plague our schools. As
JUSTICE BLACKMUN notes, teachers must not merely "maintain an environment conducive to learning" among children who
"are inclined to test the outer boundaries of acceptable conduct," but must also "protect the very safety of students and school
personnel." Ante, at 352-353. A teacher or principal could neither carry out essential teaching functions nor adequately protect
students' safety if required to wait for a warrant before conducting a necessary search.
B
I emphatically disagree with the Court's decision to cast aside the constitutional probable-cause standard when assessing the
constitutional validity of a schoolhouse search. The Court's decision jettisons the probable-cause standard - the only standard
that finds support in the text of the Fourth [469 U.S. 325, 358] Amendment - on the basis of its Rohrschach-like "balancing test."
Use of such a "balancing test" to determine the standard for evaluating the validity of a full-scale search represents a sizable
innovation in Fourth Amendment analysis. This innovation finds support neither in precedent nor policy and portends a
dangerous weakening of the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to protect the privacy and security of our citizens. Moreover,
even if this Court's historic understanding of the Fourth Amendment were mistaken and a balancing test of some kind were
appropriate, any such test that gave adequate weight to the privacy and security interests protected by the Fourth Amendment
would not reach the preordained result the Court's conclusory analysis reaches today. Therefore, because I believe that the
balancing test used by the Court today is flawed both in its inception and in its execution, I respectfully dissent.
1
An unbroken line of cases in this Court have held that probable cause is a prerequisite for a full-scale search. In Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925), the Court held that "[o]n reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and
seizure . . . are made upon probable cause . . . the search and seizure are valid." Under our past decisions probable cause -
which exists where "the facts and circumstances within [the officials'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that a criminal offense had
occurred and the evidence would be found in the suspected place, id., at 162 - is the constitutional minimum for justifying a
full-scale search, regardless of whether it is conducted pursuant to a warrant or, as in Carroll, within one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959) (Carroll "merely relaxed the requirements for a warrant
on grounds of practicality," but "did not dispense [469 U.S. 325, 359] with the need for probable cause"); accord, Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) ("In enforcing the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the
Constitution").3
Our holdings that probable cause is a prerequisite to a full-scale search are based on the relationship between the two Clauses
of the Fourth Amendment. The first Clause ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .") states the purpose of the Amendment and its coverage.
The second Clause (". . . and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause . . .") gives content to the word "unreasonable" in
the first Clause. "For all but . . . narrowly defined intrusions, the requisite `balancing' has been performed in centuries of
precedent and is embodied in the principle that seizures are `reasonable' only if supported by probable cause." Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S., at 214.
I therefore fully agree with the Court that "the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and
seizures be reasonable." Ante, at 337. But this "underlying command" is not directly interpreted in each category of cases by
some amorphous "balancing test." Rather, the provisions of the Warrant Clause - a warrant and probable cause - provide the
yardstick against which official searches [469 U.S. 325, 360] and seizures are to be measured. The Fourth Amendment neither
requires nor authorizes the conceptual free-for-all that ensues when an unguided balancing test is used to assess specific
categories of searches. If the search in question is more than a minimally intrusive Terry stop, the constitutional probable-cause
standard determines its validity.
To be sure, the Court recognizes that probable cause "ordinarily" is required to justify a full-scale search and that the existence
of probable cause "bears on" the validity of the search. Ante, at 340-341. Yet the Court fails to cite any case in which a
full-scale intrusion upon privacy interests has been justified on less than probable cause. The line of cases begun by Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), provides no support, for they applied a balancing test only in the context of minimally intrusive
searches that served crucial law enforcement interests. The search in Terry itself, for instance, was a "limited search of the outer
clothing." Id., at 30. The type of border stop at issue in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975), usually
"consume[d] no more than a minute"; the Court explicitly noted that "any further detention . . . must be based on consent or
probable cause." Id., at 882. See also United States v. Hensley, ante, at 224 (momentary stop); United States v. Place, 462
U.S., at 706-707 (brief detention of luggage for canine "sniff"); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam)
(brief frisk after stop for traffic violation); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (characterizing intrusion
as "minimal"); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (stop and frisk). In short, all of these cases involved "`seizures' so
substantially less intrusive than arrests that the general rule requiring probable cause to make Fourth Amendment `seizures'
reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test." Dunaway, supra, at 210.
Nor do the "administrative search" cases provide any comfort for the Court. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967), the Court held that the probable-cause standard governed even administrative searches. Although [469 U.S. 325, 361] the
Camara Court recognized that probable-cause standards themselves may have to be somewhat modified to take into account
the special nature of administrative searches, the Court did so only after noting that "because [housing code] inspections are
neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban
citizen's privacy." Id., at 537. Subsequent administrative search cases have similarly recognized that such searches intrude upon
areas whose owners harbor a significantly decreased expectation of privacy, see, e. g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594,
598-599 (1981), thus circumscribing the injury to Fourth Amendment interests caused by the search.
Considerations of the deepest significance for the freedom of our citizens counsel strict adherence to the principle that no search
may be conducted where the official is not in possession of probable cause - that is, where the official does not know of "facts
and circumstances [that] warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed." Henry v. United States, 361
U.S., at 102; see also id., at 100-101 (discussing history of probable-cause standard). The Fourth Amendment was designed
not merely to protect against official intrusions whose social utility was less as measured by some "balancing test" than its
intrusion on individual privacy; it was designed in addition to grant the individual a zone of privacy whose protections could be
breached only where the "reasonable" requirements of the probable-cause standard were met. Moved by whatever momentary
evil has aroused their fears, officials - perhaps even supported by a majority of citizens - may be tempted to conduct searches
that sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to assuage the perceived evil.4 But the Fourth Amendment [469 U.S. 325, 362] rests on the
principle that a true balance between the individual and society depends on the recognition of "the right to be let alone - the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). That right protects the privacy and security of the individual unless the authorities can cross a specific
threshold of need, designated by the term "probable cause." I cannot agree with the Court's assertions today that a "balancing
test" can replace the constitutional threshold with one that is more convenient for those enforcing the laws but less protective of
the citizens' liberty; the Fourth Amendment's protections should not be defaced by "a balancing process that overwhelms the
individual's protection against unwarranted official intrusion by a governmental interest said to justify the search and seizure."
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at 570 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
2
I thus do not accept the majority's premise that "[t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school
authorities is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such searches." Ante, at 337. For me, the finding that the
Fourth Amendment applies, coupled with the observation that what is at issue is a full-scale search, is the end of the inquiry. But
even if I believed that a "balancing test" appropriately replaces the judgment of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, I would
nonetheless object to the cursory and shortsighted "test" that the Court employs to justify its predictable weakening of Fourth
Amendment protections. In particular, the test employed by the Court vastly overstates the social costs that a probable-cause
standard entails and, though it plausibly articulates the serious privacy interests at stake, inexplicably fails to accord them
adequate weight in striking the balance. [469 U.S. 325, 363]
The Court begins to articulate its "balancing test" by observing that "the government's need for effective methods to deal with
breaches of public order" is to be weighed on one side of the balance. Ibid. Of course, this is not correct. It is not the
government's need for effective enforcement methods that should weigh in the balance, for ordinary Fourth Amendment
standards - including probable cause - may well permit methods for maintaining the public order that are perfectly effective. If
that were the case, the governmental interest in having effective standards would carry no weight at all as a justification for
departing from the probable-cause standard. Rather, it is the costs of applying probable cause as opposed to applying some
lesser standard that should be weighed on the government's side.5
In order to tote up the costs of applying the probable-cause standard, it is thus necessary first to take into account the nature
and content of that standard, and the likelihood that it would hamper achievement of the goal - vital not just to "teachers and
administrators," see ante, at 339 - of maintaining an effective educational setting in the public schools. The seminal statement
concerning the nature of the probable-cause standard is found in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Carroll held
that law enforcement authorities have probable cause to search where "the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and
of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to [469 U.S. 325, 364] warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief" that a criminal offense had occurred. Id., at 162. In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160
(1949), the Court amplified this requirement, holding that probable cause depends upon "the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Id., at 175.
Two Terms ago, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), this Court expounded at some length its view of the probable-cause
standard. Among the adjectives used to describe the standard were "practical," "fluid," "flexible," "easily applied," and
"nontechnical." See id., at 232, 236, 239. The probable-cause standard was to be seen as a "common-sense" test whose
application depended on an evaluation of the "totality of the circumstances." Id., at 238.
Ignoring what Gates took such great pains to emphasize, the Court today holds that a new "reasonableness" standard is
appropriate because it "will spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of
probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense." Ante, at 343.
I had never thought that our pre-Gates understanding of probable cause defied either reason or common sense. But after Gates,
I would have thought that there could be no doubt that this "nontechnical," "practical," and "easily applied" concept was
eminently serviceable in a context like a school, where teachers require the flexibility to respond quickly and decisively to
emergencies.
A consideration of the likely operation of the probable-cause standard reinforces this conclusion. Discussing the issue of school
searches, Professor LaFave has noted that the cases that have reached the appellate courts "strongly suggest that in most
instances the evidence of wrongdoing prompting teachers or principals to conduct searches is sufficiently detailed and specific to
meet the traditional probable cause test." 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 10.11, [469 U.S. 325, 365] pp. 459-460 (1978).6 The
problems that have caused this Court difficulty in interpreting the probable-cause standard have largely involved informants, see,
e. g., Illinois v. Gates, supra; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). However, three factors make it likely that problems involving informants will not make it
difficult for teachers and school administrators to make probable-cause decisions. This Court's decision in Gates applying a
"totality of the circumstances" test to determine whether an informant's tip can constitute probable cause renders the test easy
for teachers to apply. The fact that students and teachers interact daily in the school building makes it more likely that teachers
will get to know students who supply information; the problem of informants who remain anonymous even to the teachers - and
who are therefore unavailable for verification or further questioning - is unlikely to arise. Finally, teachers can observe the
behavior of students under suspicion to corroborate any doubtful tips they do receive.
As compared with the relative ease with which teachers can apply the probable-cause standard, the amorphous
"reasonableness under all the circumstances" standard freshly coined by the Court today will likely spawn increased litigation
and greater uncertainty among teachers and administrators. Of course, as this Court should know, an essential purpose of
developing and articulating legal norms is to enable individuals to conform their conduct to those norms. A school system
conscientiously attempting to obey the Fourth Amendment's dictates under a probable-cause standard could, for example,
consult decisions and other legal materials and prepare a booklet expounding the rough outlines of the concept. Such a booklet
could be distributed to [469 U.S. 325, 366] teachers to provide them with guidance as to when a search may be lawfully conducted.
I cannot but believe that the same school system faced with interpreting what is permitted under the Court's new
"reasonableness" standard would be hopelessly adrift as to when a search may be permissible. The sad result of this uncertainty
may well be that some teachers will be reluctant to conduct searches that are fully permissible and even necessary under the
constitutional probable-cause standard, while others may intrude arbitrarily and unjustifiably on the privacy of students.7
One further point should be taken into account when considering the desirability of replacing the constitutional probable-cause
standard. The question facing the Court is not whether the probable-cause standard should be replaced by a test of
"reasonableness under all the circumstances." Rather, it is whether traditional Fourth Amendment standards should recede
before the Court's new standard. Thus, although the Court today paints with a broad brush and holds its undefined
"reasonableness" standard applicable to all school searches, I would approach the question with considerably more reserve. I
would not think it necessary to develop a single standard to govern all school searches, any more [469 U.S. 325, 367] than
traditional Fourth Amendment law applies even the probable-cause standard to all searches and seizures. For instance, just as
police officers may conduct a brief stop and frisk on something less than probable cause, so too should teachers be permitted
the same flexibility. A teacher or administrator who had reasonable suspicion that a student was carrying a gun would no doubt
have authority under ordinary Fourth Amendment doctrine to conduct a limited search of the student to determine whether the
threat was genuine. The "costs" of applying the traditional probable-cause standard must therefore be discounted by the fact
that, where additional flexibility is necessary and where the intrusion is minor, traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence itself
displaces probable cause when it determines the validity of a search.
A legitimate balancing test whose function was something more substantial than reaching a predetermined conclusion acceptable
to this Court's impressions of what authority teachers need would therefore reach rather a different result than that reached by
the Court today. On one side of the balance would be the costs of applying traditional Fourth Amendment standards - the
"practical" and "flexible" probable-cause standard where a full-scale intrusion is sought, a lesser standard in situations where the
intrusion is much less severe and the need for greater authority compelling. Whatever costs were toted up on this side would
have to be discounted by the costs of applying an unprecedented and ill-defined "reasonableness under all the circumstances"
test that will leave teachers and administrators uncertain as to their authority and will encourage excessive fact-based litigation.
On the other side of the balance would be the serious privacy interests of the student, interests that the Court admirably
articulates in its opinion, ante, at 337-339, but which the Court's new ambiguous standard places in serious jeopardy. I have no
doubt that a fair assessment of the two [469 U.S. 325, 368] sides of the balance would necessarily reach the same conclusion that,
as I have argued above, the Fourth Amendment's language compels - that school searches like that conducted in this case are
valid only if supported by probable cause.
II
Applying the constitutional probable-cause standard to the facts of this case, I would find that Mr. Choplick's search violated T.
L. O.'s Fourth Amendment rights. After escorting T.L.O. into his private office, Mr. Choplick demanded to see her purse. He
then opened the purse to find evidence of whether she had been smoking in the bathroom. When he opened the purse, he
discovered the pack of cigarettes. At this point, his search for evidence of the smoking violation was complete.
Mr. Choplick then noticed, below the cigarettes, a pack of cigarette rolling papers. Believing that such papers were
"associated," see ante, at 328, with the use of marihuana, he proceeded to conduct a detailed examination of the contents of her
purse, in which he found some marihuana, a pipe, some money, an index card, and some private letters indicating that T.L.O.
had sold marihuana to other students. The State sought to introduce this latter material in evidence at a criminal proceeding, and
the issue before the Court is whether it should have been suppressed.
On my view of the case, we need not decide whether the initial search conducted by Mr. Choplick - the search for evidence of
the smoking violation that was completed when Mr. Choplick found the pack of cigarettes - was valid. For Mr. Choplick at that
point did not have probable cause to continue to rummage through T.L.O.'s purse. Mr. Choplick's suspicion of marihuana
possession at this time was based solely on the presence of the package of cigarette papers. The mere presence without more
of such a staple item of commerce is insufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in inferring both that T.L.O. had
violated the law [469 U.S. 325, 369] by possessing marihuana and that evidence of that violation would be found in her purse. Just
as a police officer could not obtain a warrant to search a home based solely on his claim that he had seen a package of cigarette
papers in that home, Mr. Choplick was not entitled to search possibly the most private possessions of T.L.O. based on the
mere presence of a package of cigarette papers. Therefore, the fruits of this illegal search must be excluded and the judgment of
the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed.
III
In the past several Terms, this Court has produced a succession of Fourth Amendment opinions in which "balancing tests" have
been applied to resolve various questions concerning the proper scope of official searches. The Court has begun to apply a
"balancing test" to determine whether a particular category of searches intrudes upon expectations of privacy that merit Fourth
Amendment protection. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984) ("Determining whether an expectation of privacy is
`legitimate' or `reasonable' necessarily entails a balancing of interests"). It applies a "balancing test" to determine whether a
warrant is necessary to conduct a search. See ante, at 340; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S., at 564-566. In today's
opinion, it employs a "balancing test" to determine what standard should govern the constitutionality of a given category of
searches. See ante, at 340-341. Should a search turn out to be unreasonable after application of all of these "balancing tests,"
the Court then applies an additional "balancing test" to decide whether the evidence resulting from the search must be excluded.
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
All of these "balancing tests" amount to brief nods by the Court in the direction of a neutral utilitarian calculus while the Court in
fact engages in an unanalyzed exercise of judicial will. Perhaps this doctrinally destructive nihilism is merely [469 U.S. 325, 370] a
convenient umbrella under which a majority that cannot agree on a genuine rationale can conceal its differences. Compare ante,
p. 327 (WHITE, J., delivering the opinion of the Court), with ante, p. 348 (POWELL, J., joined by O'CONNOR, J.,
concurring), and ante, p. 351 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment). And it may be that the real force underlying today's
decision is the belief that the Court purports to reject - the belief that the unique role served by the schools justifies an exception
to the Fourth Amendment on their behalf. If so, the methodology of today's decision may turn out to have as little influence in
future cases as will its result, and the Court's departure from traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine will be confined to the
schools.
On my view, the presence of the word "unreasonable" in the text of the Fourth Amendment does not grant a shifting majority of
this Court the authority to answer all Fourth Amendment questions by consulting its momentary vision of the social good.
Full-scale searches unaccompanied by probable cause violate the Fourth Amendment. I do not pretend that our traditional
Fourth Amendment doctrine automatically answers all of the difficult legal questions that occasionally arise. I do contend,
however, that this Court has an obligation to provide some coherent framework to resolve such questions on the basis of more
than a conclusory recitation of the results of a "balancing test." The Fourth Amendment itself supplies that framework and,
because the Court today fails to heed its message, I must respectfully dissent.
[Footnote 1] A purse typically contains items of highly personal nature. Especially for shy or sensitive adolescents, it could
prove extremely embarrassing for a teacher or principal to rummage through its contents, which could include notes from
friends, fragments of love poems, caricatures of school authorities, and items of personal hygiene.
[Footnote 2] Administrative search cases involving inspection schemes have recognized that "if inspection is to be effective and
serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential. In this context, the prerequisite of a warrant
could easily frustrate inspection . . . ." United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972); accord, Donovan v. Dewey, 452
U.S. 594, 603 (1981). Cf. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (holding that a warrant is nonetheless necessary in
some administrative search contexts).
[Footnote 3] In fact, despite the somewhat diminished expectation of privacy that this Court has recognized in the automobile
context, see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-368 (1976), we have required probable cause even to justify a
warrantless automobile search, see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975) ("A search, even of an automobile, is a
substantial invasion of privacy. To protect that privacy from official arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable cause
as the minimum requirement for a lawful search") (footnote omitted); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S., at 51.
[Footnote 4] As Justice Stewart said in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971): "In times of unrest, whether
caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal subversion, this basic law and the values that it represents may appear
unrealistic or `extravagant' to some. But the values were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts."
[Footnote 5] I speak of the "government's side" only because it is the terminology used by the Court. In my view, this
terminology itself is seriously misleading. The government is charged with protecting the privacy and security of the citizen, just
as it is charged with apprehending those who violate the criminal law. Consequently, the government has no legitimate interest in
conducting a search that unduly intrudes on the privacy and security of the citizen. The balance is not between the rights of the
government and the rights of the citizen, but between opposing conceptions of the constitutionally legitimate means of carrying
out the government's varied responsibilities.
[Footnote 6] It should be noted that Professor LaFave reached this conclusion in 1978, before this Court's decision in Gates
made clear the "flexibility" of the probable-cause concept.
[Footnote 7] A comparison of the language of the standard ("reasonableness under all the circumstances") with the traditional
language of probable cause ("facts sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that a crime had been
committed and the evidence would be found in the designated place") suggests that the Court's new standard may turn out to be
probable cause under a new guise. If so, the additional uncertainty caused by this Court's innovation is surely unjustifiable; it
would be naive to expect that the addition of this extra dose of uncertainty would do anything other than "burden the efforts of
school authorities to maintain order in their schools," ante, at 342. If, on the other hand, the new standard permits searches of
students in instances when probable cause is absent - instances, according to this Court's consistent formulations, when a
person of reasonable caution would not think it likely that a violation existed or that evidence of that violation would be found -
the new standard is genuinely objectionable and impossible to square with the premise that our citizens have the right to be free
from arbitrary intrusions on their privacy.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, and with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins as to Part I,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Assistant Vice Principal Choplick searched T.L.O.'s purse for evidence that she was smoking in the girls' restroom. Because
T.L.O.'s suspected misconduct was not illegal and did not pose a serious threat to school discipline, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that Choplick's search [469 U.S. 325, 371] of her purse was an unreasonable invasion of her privacy and that the
evidence which he seized could not be used against her in criminal proceedings. The New Jersey court's holding was a careful
response to the case it was required to decide.
The State of New Jersey sought review in this Court, first arguing that the exclusionary rule is wholly inapplicable to searches
conducted by school officials, and then contending that the Fourth Amendment itself provides no protection at all to the
student's privacy. The Court has accepted neither of these frontal assaults on the Fourth Amendment. It has, however, seized
upon this "no smoking" case to announce "the proper standard" that should govern searches by school officials who are
confronted with disciplinary problems far more severe than smoking in the restroom. Although I join Part II of the Court's
opinion, I continue to believe that the Court has unnecessarily and inappropriately reached out to decide a constitutional
question. See 468 U.S. 1214 (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting from reargument order). More importantly, I fear that the
concerns that motivated the Court's activism have produced a holding that will permit school administrators to search students
suspected of violating only the most trivial school regulations and guidelines for behavior.
I
The question the Court decides today - whether Mr. Choplick's search of T.L.O.'s purse violated the Fourth Amendment -
was not raised by the State's petition for writ of certiorari. That petition only raised one question: "Whether the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule applies to searches made by public school officials and teachers in school."1 The State quite
properly declined to submit the former question because "[it] did not wish to present what might appear to be solely a factual
dispute to this Court."2 [469 U.S. 325, 372] Since this Court has twice had the threshold question argued, I believe that it should
expressly consider the merits of the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling that the exclusionary rule applies.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's holding on this question is plainly correct. As the state court noted, this case does not involve
the use of evidence in a school disciplinary proceeding; the juvenile proceedings brought against T.L.O. involved a charge that
would have been a criminal offense if committed by an adult.3 Accordingly, the exclusionary rule issue decided by that court
and later presented to this Court concerned only the use in a criminal proceeding of evidence obtained in a search conducted by
a public school administrator.
Having confined the issue to the law enforcement context, the New Jersey court then reasoned that this Court's cases have
made it quite clear that the exclusionary rule is equally applicable "whether the public official who illegally obtained the evidence
was a municipal inspector, See v. Seattle 387 U.S. 541 1967.; Camara [v. Municipal Court,] 387 U.S. 523 1967.; a firefighter,
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 1978.; or a school administrator or law enforcement official."4 It correctly concluded
"that if an official search violates constitutional rights, the evidence is not admissible in criminal proceedings."5
When a defendant in a criminal proceeding alleges that she was the victim of an illegal search by a school administrator, the
application of the exclusionary rule is a simple corollary of the principle that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
The practical basis for this principle is, in part, its deterrent effect, see id., at 656, and as a general [469 U.S. 325, 373] matter it is
tolerably clear to me, as it has been to the Court, that the existence of an exclusionary remedy does deter the authorities from
violating the Fourth Amendment by sharply reducing their incentive to do so.6 In the case of evidence obtained in school
searches, the "overall educative effect"7 of the exclusionary rule adds important symbolic force to this utilitarian judgment.
Justice Brandeis was both a great student and a great teacher. It was he who wrote:
"Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting
opinion).
Those of us who revere the flag and the ideals for which it stands believe in the power of symbols. We cannot ignore that rules
of law also have a symbolic power that may vastly exceed their utility.
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a
self-governing citizenry.8 If the Nation's students can be convicted through the use of arbitrary methods destructive of personal
liberty, they cannot help but feel that they have [469 U.S. 325, 374] been dealt with unfairly.9 The application of the exclusionary
rule in criminal proceedings arising from illegal school searches makes an important statement to young people that "our society
attaches serious consequences to a violation of constitutional rights,"10 and that this is a principle of "liberty and justice for
all."11
Thus, the simple and correct answer to the question presented by the State's petition for certiorari would have required
affirmance of a state court's judgment suppressing evidence. That result would have been dramatically out of character for a
Court that not only grants prosecutors relief from suppression orders with distressing regularity,12 but [469 U.S. 325, 375] also is
prone to rely on grounds not advanced by the parties in order to protect evidence from exclusion.13 In characteristic disregard
of the doctrine of judicial restraint, the Court avoided that result in this case by ordering reargument and directing the parties to
address a constitutional question that the parties, with good reason, had not asked the Court to decide. Because judicial
activism undermines the Court's power to perform its central mission in a legitimate way, I dissented from the reargument order.
See 468 U.S. 1214 (1984). I have not modified the views expressed in that dissent, but since the majority has brought the
question before us, I shall explain why I believe the Court has misapplied the standard of reasonableness embodied in the
Fourth Amendment.
II
The search of a young woman's purse by a school administrator is a serious invasion of her legitimate expectations of privacy. A
purse "is a common repository for one's personal effects and therefore is inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy."
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979). Although such expectations must sometimes yield to the legitimate
requirements of government, in assessing the constitutionality of a warrantless search, our decision must be guided by the
language of the Fourth Amendment: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, [469 U.S. 325, 376] papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." In order to evaluate the reasonableness of such
searches, "it is necessary `first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the
constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,' for there is `no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search [or size] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.'" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20-21 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 534-537, (1967)).14
The "limited search for weapons" in Terry was justified by the "immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
him." 392 U.S., at 23, 25. When viewed from the institutional perspective, "the substantial need of teachers and administrators
for freedom to maintain order in the schools," ante, at 341 (majority opinion), is no less acute. Violent, unlawful, or seriously
disruptive conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the principal function of teaching institutions which is to educate young
people and prepare them for citizenship.15 When such conduct occurs amidst a sizable group of impressionable young people,
it creates an explosive atmosphere that requires a prompt and effective response.
Thus, warrantless searches of students by school administrators are reasonable when undertaken for those purposes. [469 U.S.
325, 377] But the majority's statement of the standard for evaluating the reasonableness of such searches is not suitably adapted
to that end. The majority holds that "a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be `justified at its inception'
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is
violating either the law or the rules of the school." Ante, at 341-342. This standard will permit teachers and school
administrators to search students when they suspect that the search will reveal evidence of even the most trivial school regulation
or precatory guideline for student behavior. The Court's standard for deciding whether a search is justified "at its inception"
treats all violations of the rules of the school as though they were fungible. For the Court, a search for curlers and sunglasses in
order to enforce the school dress code16 is apparently just as important as a search for evidence of heroin addiction or violent
gang activity.
The majority, however, does not contend that school administrators have a compelling need to search students in [469 U.S. 325,
378] order to achieve optimum enforcement of minor school regulations.17 To the contrary, when minor violations are involved,
there is every indication that the informal school disciplinary process, with only minimum requirements of due process,18 can
function effectively without the power to search for enough evidence to prove a criminal case. In arguing that teachers and
school administrators need the power to search students based on a lessened standard, the United States as amicus curiae relies
heavily on empirical evidence of a contemporary crisis of violence and unlawful behavior that is seriously undermining the
process of education in American schools.19 A standard better attuned to this concern would permit teachers and school
administrators to search a student when they have reason to believe that the search will uncover evidence that the student is
violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disruptive of school order, or the educational process.
This standard is properly directed at "[t]he sole justification for the [warrantless] search."20 In addition, a standard [469 U.S. 325,
379] that varies the extent of the permissible intrusion with the gravity of the suspected offense is also more consistent with
common-law experience and this Court's precedent. Criminal law has traditionally recognized a distinction between essentially
regulatory offenses and serious violations of the peace, and graduated the response of the criminal justice system depending on
the character of the violation.21 The application of a similar distinction in evaluating the reasonableness of warrantless searches
and seizures "is not a novel idea." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984).22
In Welsh, police officers arrived at the scene of a traffic accident and obtained information indicating that the driver of the
automobile involved was guilty of a first offense of [469 U.S. 325, 380] driving while intoxicated - a civil violation with a maximum
fine of $200. The driver had left the scene of the accident, and the officers followed the suspect to his home where they arrested
him without a warrant. Absent exigent circumstances, the warrantless invasion of the home was a clear violation of Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In holding that the warrantless arrest for the "noncriminal, traffic offense" in Welsh was
unconstitutional, the Court noted that "application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should
rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense . . . has been committed." 466 U.S., at
753.
The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in evaluating the reasonableness of school searches is almost too
clear for argument. In order to justify the serious intrusion on the persons and privacy of young people that New Jersey asks this
Court to approve, the State must identify "some real immediate and serious consequences." McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 460 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring, joined by Frankfurter, J.).23 While school administrators have entirely
legitimate reasons for adopting school regulations and guidelines for student behavior, the authorization of searches to enforce
them "displays a shocking lack of all sense of proportion." Id., 459.24 [469 U.S. 325, 381]
The majority offers weak deference to these principles of balance and decency by announcing that school searches will only be
reasonable in scope "when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Ante, at 342 (emphasis added). The majority
offers no explanation why a two-part standard is necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of the ordinary school search.
Significantly, in the balance of its opinion the Court pretermits any discussion of the nature of T.L.O.'s infraction of the "no
smoking" rule.
The "rider" to the Court's standard for evaluating the reasonableness of the initial intrusion apparently is the Court's perception
that its standard is overly generous and does not, by itself, achieve a fair balance between the administrator's right to search and
the student's reasonable expectations of privacy. The Court's standard for evaluating the "scope" of reasonable school searches
is obviously designed to prohibit physically intrusive searches of students by persons of the opposite sex for relatively minor
offenses. The Court's effort to establish a standard that is, at once, clear enough to allow searches to be upheld in nearly every
case, and flexible enough to prohibit obviously unreasonable intrusions of young adults' privacy only creates uncertainty in the
extent of its resolve to prohibit the latter. Moreover, the majority's application of its standard in this case - to permit a male
administrator to rummage through the purse of a female high school student in order to obtain evidence that she was smoking
[469 U.S. 325, 382] in a bathroom - raises grave doubts in my mind whether its effort will be effective.25 Unlike the Court, I believe
the nature of the suspected infraction is a matter of first importance in deciding whether any invasion of privacy is permissible.
III
The Court embraces the standard applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court as equivalent to its own, and then deprecates the
state court's application of the standard as reflecting "a somewhat crabbed notion of reasonableness." Ante, at 343. There is no
mystery, however, in the state court's finding that the search in this case was unconstitutional; the decision below was not based
on a manipulation of reasonable suspicion, but on the trivial character of the activity that promoted the official search. The New
Jersey Supreme Court wrote:
"We are satisfied that when a school official has reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal
activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline and order, the school official has the right to conduct a
reasonable search for such evidence.
"In determining whether the school official has reasonable grounds, courts should consider `the child's age, history, and
school record, the prevalence and seriousness of the problem in the school to which the search was [469 U.S. 325, 383]
directed, the exigency to make the search without delay, and the probative value and reliability of the information used as
a justification for the search.'"26
The emphasized language in the state court's opinion focuses on the character of the rule infraction that is to be the object of the
search.
In the view of the state court, there is a quite obvious and material difference between a search for evidence relating to violent or
disruptive activity, and a search for evidence of a smoking rule violation. This distinction does not imply that a no-smoking rule is
a matter of minor importance. Rather, like a rule that prohibits a student from being tardy, its occasional violation in a context
that poses no threat of disrupting school order and discipline offers no reason to believe that an immediate search is necessary
to avoid unlawful conduct, violence, or a serious impairment of the educational process.
A correct understanding of the New Jersey court's standard explains why that court concluded in T.L.O.'s case that "the
assistant principal did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the student was concealing in her purse evidence of criminal
activity or evidence of activity that would seriously interfere with school discipline or order."27 The importance of the nature of
the rule infraction to the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding is evident from its brief explanation of the principal basis for its
decision:
"A student has an expectation of privacy in the contents of her purse. Mere possession of cigarettes did not violate school
rule or policy, since the school allowed smoking in designated areas. The contents of the handbag had no direct bearing
on the infraction.
"The assistant principal's desire, legal in itself, to gather evidence to impeach the student's credibility at a [469 U.S. 325, 384]
hearing on the disciplinary infraction does not validate the search."28
Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, I would view this case differently if the Assistant Vice Principal had reason to believe T.
L. O.'s purse contained evidence of criminal activity, or of an activity that would seriously disrupt school discipline. There was,
however, absolutely no basis for any such assumption - not even a "hunch."
In this case, Mr. Choplick overreacted to what appeared to be nothing more than a minor infraction - a rule prohibiting smoking
in the bathroom of the freshmen's and sophomores' building.29 It is, of course, true that he actually found evidence of serious
wrongdoing by T.L.O. , but no one claims that the prior search may be justified by his unexpected discovery. As far as the
smoking infraction is concerned, the search for cigarettes merely tended to corroborate a teacher's eyewitness account of T. L.
O.'s violation of a minor regulation designed to channel student smoking behavior into designated locations. Because this
conduct was neither unlawful nor significantly disruptive of school order or the educational process, the invasion of privacy
associated with the forcible opening of T.L.O.'s purse was entirely unjustified at its inception.
A review of the sampling of school search cases relied on by the Court demonstrates how different this case is from those [469
U.S. 325, 385] in which there was indeed a valid justification for intruding on a student's privacy. In most of them the student was
suspected of a criminal violation;30 in the remainder either violence or substantial disruption of school order or the integrity of
the academic process was at stake.31 Few involved matters as trivial as the no-smoking rule violated by T.L.O. 32 The rule
the Court adopts today is so open-ended that it may make the Fourth Amendment virtually meaningless in the school context.
Although I agree that school administrators must have broad latitude to maintain order and discipline in our classrooms, that
authority is not unlimited.
IV
The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to experience the power of government. Through it passes every
citizen and public official, from schoolteachers to [469 U.S. 325, 386] policemen and prison guards. The values they learn there,
they take with them in life. One of our most cherished ideals is the one contained in the Fourth Amendment: that the government
may not intrude on the personal privacy of its citizens without a warrant or compelling circumstance. The Court's decision today
is a curious moral for the Nation's youth. Although the search of T.L.O.'s purse does not trouble today's majority, I submit that
we are not dealing with "matters relatively trivial to the welfare of the Nation. There are village tyrants as well as village
Hampdens, but none who acts under color of law is beyond reach of the Constitution." West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
I respectfully dissent.
[Footnote 1] Pet. for Cert. i.
[Footnote 2] Supplemental Brief for Petitioner 6.
[Footnote 3] State ex rel. T.L.O. , 94 N. J. 331, 337, nn. 1 and 2, 342, n. 5, 463 A. 2d 934, 937, nn. 1 and 2, 939, n. 5
(1983).
[Footnote 4] Id., at 341, 463 A. 2d, at 939.
[Footnote 5] Id., at 341-342, 463 A. 2d, at 939.
[Footnote 6] See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453 (1976); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-348 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-175 (1969).
[Footnote 7] Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S., at 493.
[Footnote 8] See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864-865 (1982) (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL and
STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 876, 880 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 221 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 507, 511-513 (1969); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
[Footnote 9] Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1967). JUSTICE BRENNAN has written of an analogous case:
"We do not know what class petitioner was attending when the police and dogs burst in, but the lesson the school
authorities taught her that day will undoubtedly make a greater impression than the one her teacher had hoped to convey.
I would grant certiorari to teach petitioner another lesson: that the Fourth Amendment protects `[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures' . . . . Schools
cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good citizenship when the school authorities themselves disregard the
fundamental principles underpinning our constitutional freedoms." Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027-1028 (1981)
(dissenting from denial of certiorari).
[Footnote 10] Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S., at 492.
[Footnote 11] 36 U.S.C. 172 (pledge of allegiance to the flag).
[Footnote 12] A brief review of the Fourth Amendment cases involving criminal prosecutions since the October Term, 1982,
supports the proposition. Compare Florida v. Rodriguez, ante, p. 1 (per curiam); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984);
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984); United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984);
Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984) (per curiam); Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380 (1984) (per curiam); Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730
(1983); United States v. Knotts, [469 U.S. 325, 375] 460 U.S. 276 (1983); Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112 (1983) (per
curiam); Cardwell v. Taylor, 461 U.S. 571 (1983) (per curiam), with Thompson v. Louisiana, ante, p. 17 (per curiam); Welsh
v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
[Footnote 13] E. g. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S., at 719-721; see also Segura v. United States, 468 U.S., at 805-813
(opinion of BURGER, C. J., joined by O'CONNOR, J.); cf. Illinois v. Gates, 459 U.S. 1028 (1982) (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting from reargument order, joined by BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ.)
[Footnote 14] See also United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-882 (1975); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 567 (1976).
[Footnote 15] Cf. ante, at 353 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment) ("The special need for an immediate response to
behavior that threatens either the safety of schoolchildren and teachers or the educational process itself justifies the Court in
excepting school searches from the warrant and probable-cause requirement"); ante, at 350 (POWELL, J., concurring, joined
by O'CONNOR, J.) ("Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their
students").
[Footnote 16] Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N. J.] H. S. (1979), Record Doc. S-1, p. 7. A brief survey of school
rule books reveals that, under the majority's approach, teachers and school administrators may also search students to enforce
school rules regulating:
(i) secret societies; (ii) students driving to school; (iii) parking and use of parking lots during school hours; (iv) smoking on
campus; (v) the direction of traffic in the hallways; (vi) student presence in the hallways during class hours without a pass; (vii)
profanity; (viii) school attendance of interscholastic athletes on the day of a game, meet or match; (ix) cafeteria use and cleanup;
(x) eating lunch off-campus; and (xi) unauthorized absence.
See id., at 7-18; Student Handbook of South Windsor [Conn.] H. S. (1984); Fairfax County [Va.] Public Schools, Student
Responsibilities and Rights (1980); Student Handbook of Chantilly [Va.] H. S. (1984).
[Footnote 17] Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-536 (1967) ("There is unanimous agreement among those
most familiar with this field that the only effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards required by
municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections of all structures. . . . [I]f the probable cause standard . . . is adopted, . . .
the reasonable goals of code enforcement will be dealt a crushing blow").
[Footnote 18] See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-584 (1975).
[Footnote 19] "The sad truth is that many classrooms across the country are not temples of learning teaching the lessons of
good will, civility, and wisdom that are central to the fabric of American life. To the contrary, many schools are in such a state of
disorder that not only is the educational atmosphere polluted, but the very safety of students and teachers is imperiled." Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 23.
See also Brief for National Education Association as Amicus Curiae 21 ("If a suspected violation of a rule threatens to disrupt
the school or threatens to harm students, school officials should be free to search for evidence of it").
[Footnote 20] Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 881-882.
[Footnote 21] Throughout the criminal law this dichotomy has been expressed by classifying crimes as misdemeanors or
felonies, malum prohibitum or malum in se, crimes that do not involve moral turpitude or those that do, and major or petty
offenses. See generally W. LaFave, Handbook on Criminal Law 6 (1972).
Some codes of student behavior also provide a system of graduated response by distinguishing between violent, unlawful, or
seriously disruptive conduct, and conduct that will only warrant serious sanctions when the student engages in repetitive
offenses. See, e. g., Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N. J.] H. S. (1979), Record Doc. S-1, pp. 15-16; Student
Handbook of South Windsor [Conn.] H. S. E (1984); Rules of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, Ch. IV,
431.1-.10 (1982). Indeed, at Piscataway High School a violation of smoking regulations that is "[a] student's first offense will
result in assignment of up to three (3) days of after school classes concerning hazards of smoking." Record Doc. S-1, supra, at
15.
[Footnote 22] In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S., at 582-583 (emphasis added), the Court noted that similar considerations require
some variance in the requirements of due process in the school disciplinary context:
"[A]s a general rule notice and hearing should precede removal of the student from school. We agree . . ., however, that
there are recurring situations in which prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted upon. Students whose presence poses a
continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may be immediately
removed from school. In such cases the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow as soon as practicable . .
. ."
[Footnote 23] In McDonald police officers made a warrantless search of the office of an illegal "numbers" operation. Justice
Jackson rejected the view that the search could be supported by exigent circumstances:
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a forced entry without a warrant, no such
emergency was present in this case. . . . Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a
warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . [The defendant's] criminal operation, while a shabby swindle that the police are
quite right in suppressing, was not one which endangered life or limb or the peace and good order of the community . . .
." 335 U.S., at 459-460.
[Footnote 24] While a policeman who sees a person smoking in an elevator in violation of a city ordinance may conduct a
full-blown search for evidence of the [469 U.S. 325, 381] smoking violation in the unlikely event of a custodial arrest, United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265-266 (1973), it is more doubtful whether a
search of this kind would be reasonable if the officer only planned to issue a citation to the offender and depart, see Robinson,
414 U.S., at 236, n. 6. In any case, the majority offers no rationale supporting its conclusion that a student detained by school
officials for questioning, on reasonable suspicion that she has violated a school rule, is entitled to no more protection under the
Fourth Amendment than a criminal suspect under custodial arrest.
[Footnote 25] One thing is clear under any standard - the shocking strip searches that are described in some cases have no
place in the schoolhouse. See Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (CA7 1980) ("It does not require a constitutional scholar
to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude"), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 1022 (1981); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (NDNY 1977); People v. D., 34 N. Y. 2d 483, 315 N. E. 2d 466
(1974); M. J. v. State, 399 So.2d 996 (Fla. App. 1981). To the extent that deeply intrusive searches are ever reasonable
outside the custodial context, it surely must only be to prevent imminent, and serious harm.
[Footnote 26] 94 N. J., at 346, 463 A. 2d, at 941-942 (quoting State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 81, 558 P.2d 781, 784
(1977)) (emphasis added).
[Footnote 27] 94 N. J., at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942 (emphasis added).
[Footnote 28] Ibid. The court added:
"Moreover, there were not reasonable grounds to believe that the purse contained cigarettes, if they were the object of
the search. No one had furnished information to that effect to the school official. He had, at best, a good hunch. No
doubt good hunches would unearth much more evidence of crime on the persons of students and citizens as a whole. But
more is required to sustain a search." Id., at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942-943.
It is this portion of the New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning - a portion that was not necessary to its holding - to which this
Court makes its principal response. See ante, at 345-346.
[Footnote 29] See Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N. J.] H. S. 15, 18 (1979), Record Doc. S-1. See also Tr. of
Mar. 31, 1980, Hearing 13-14.
[Footnote 30] See, e. g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (CA6 1984) (search for marihuana); M. v. Board of Education
Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288 (SD Ill. 1977) (drugs and large amount of money); D. R.
C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982) (stolen money); In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973)
(marihuana); In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970) (amphetamine pills); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App.
2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969) (methedrine pills); State v. Baccino, 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971) (drugs); State v. D.
T. W., 425 So.2d 1383 (Fla. App. 1983) (drugs); In re J. A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980) (marihuana);
People v. Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975) (drug pills); Mercer v. State, 450 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1970) (marihuana); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977) ("speed").
[Footnote 31] See, e. g., In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979) (search for knife or razor blade); R. C.
M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983) (student with bloodshot eyes wandering halls in violation of school rule
requiring students to remain in examination room or at home during midterm examinations).
[Footnote 32] See, e. g., State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S. E. 2d 586 (three students searched when they made furtive
gestures and displayed obvious consciousness of guilt), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N. M. 347, 540
P.2d 827 (1975) (student searched for pipe when a teacher saw him using it to violate smoking regulations). [469 U.S. 325, 387]
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